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Adversaries Make Mistakes

Give your adversary every opportunity to make a mistake.

This is my first maxim of Information Security. It is my keystone. We hear variations on this. An adversary only needs to be right once to get in, but then only needs to be wrong once to be discovered. APT 1 had behaviors that led FireEye to track them to Shanghai and a building tied to China's People's Third Army. Crowdstrike reviewed the DNC hack and was able to discern that two separate Russian intelligence bureaus hacked into the system, and didn't realize the other also had. Guccifer 2.0 forgot to turn on his VPN just once before going onto twitter and his location was tagged in a building in Moscow tied to an intelligence directorate. Stuxnet was traced back to the NSA, Duqu to the Israelis. The best of the best make mistakes. This leads to a corollary to my first maxim: on a long enough timeline, everyone makes a mistake.

Here's a story that was shared with me by a good friend in the industry. It is missing relevant details out of respect for my friend. Some details have been changed. The processes, trail, and TTPs are accurate. Apologies to Dick Wolf.

An adversary (henceforth identified as Beetroot) was intent to commit fraud. Beetroot would accomplish this by pretending to be an American company that would help foreign businesses get loans that would allow it to establish a presence inside the United States. The presence would help them register with the IRS and get an Employee Identification Number. Beetroot would claim to be able to facilitate the paperwork, the line of credit with an American bank, and set up contacts in the United States for the foreign business allowing them access to the lucrative American markets, for a moderate to large fee with a revenue sharing percentage over some amount of time. Beetroot claimed to be able to do this because he was a university professor with access to Masters and PhD candidates to do the work for research and credits. Beetroot would reach out to targets by utilizing Search Engine Optimization (SEO) on popular foreign search engines (Yandex or Baidu, for example).

Beetroot had been running this scam for a long time. As he didn't target American citizens or businesses, no one domestically took any notice. His fee amounts were small enough foreign governments wouldn't go through the hassle of dealing with the US State Department to attempt to apprehend Beetroot or retrieve the money. Beetroot was safe.

Beetroot would do some brand impersonation on a website. One of the brands he impersonated found out and had his site taken down. Beetroot spun up another site and impersonated someone else.

Later on Beetroot spun up another site, with a domain name very similar to the one that had previously been used against my friend. Once again, my friend's educational institution (a collegiate business school in the greater midwest) found the site, and worked to take it down. My friend came to me and asked me to take a look at what he had. We worked at different shops but were both contracting through the same firm so NDAs were easy to handle.

### I reread that NDA 4 times before hitting publish. This births a new maxim. Do not mess with an NDA.

Beetroot used servers in Eastern Europe. Beetroot used privacy guard. Beetroot used publicly available information from any search engine to do the impersonation. Beetroot had no digital footprint of any kind in the US. There wasn't much to go on. Except Beetroot went back to the well and impersonated the same school twice (mistake #1).

This time Beetroot's tradecraft was nearly flawless. But, since the attack was virtually identical in every way (what he did, how he did it, who he targeted, where the targets lived) one could say with moderate confidence it was the same adversary. So the focus of the investigation was the original impersonation website.

Both websites were a variation on the school's URL acronym, but at .com instead of .edu (many schools, even business schools, don't register the .com - poor brand defense). But, on the original one, Beetroot made one hiccup. At one point he switched registrars. Maybe it was due to being cheap, maybe he had a deal, maybe he liked the local geolocation better. But the day he switched, he forgot to check the box for whois privacy. (mistake #2). And for one day, the full whois record was listed, and passive DNS captured it in perpetuity. There was no name, but there was an e-mail address, and a street address. Tied to the registration date, we had behaviors tied to an indicator - we had pivot points. The e-mail address turned up three more websites that were impersonating Australian and New Zealand schools that had business and law departments specializing in South Pacific maritime law, offering to (for a fee) set up businesses in regional countries to deal with shipping laws. Same scam, different business model (mistake #3).

The street address was diamond studded 24 carat platinum plated solid gold. Over 40 websites with 15 different e-mail addresses tied to that address. All 40 sites were hosted on one of three different Middle Eastern bulletproof hosts. At each host, all the sites lived on a /30 subnet. Every single site used the same web server. The web server differences were tied to versions, and the versions tracked to when the sites were spun up. There were more sites on those subnets, and they led to a few more e-mail addresses, which led to a few more sites (mistakes 4 -1329542). These took the timeline to a point, when Beetroot figured to privacy guard everything. There were tons of pivot points to investigate, spoofing tons of other schools in English speaking countries.

That wasn't all. Looking at the original site that spawned the original investigation, there was one line of text that stood out. It looks like a sentence was run through Google Translate into another language and back into English. The original line wasn't hard to guess, and when run through translate into Russian and back into English it produced the distinctive sentence. We ran a Google search on that sentence. We got three hits. One website didn't exist anymore. The other two did. And they were near carbon copies of the original website my friend originally investigated. Those two were privacy guarded. And they had the same web server, same web structure, and operated on a subnet that tied to an early DNS record for the original imposter site (mistake X). But the defunct website was a diamond the size of a softball.

The original site was <university acronym>.<general university-biz word dash LLP>.com. It contained multiple subdomains for all the business types Beetroot would spoof. Whois wasn't private, the address nearly lines up (one digit was off), and the registrant had a phone number, and it had the area code and local prefix of the city and state in the whois. Later in the whois history, Beetroot switched phone numbers to a Google Voice number, which used geolocation to give him a number with the same area code and prefix. The registration date puts this as the first site spun up. A web archive view of the site showed a very rough draft of some of the impersonating sites.

The cherry on top - Google Earth. The addresses should be tied to a lat // long scale. Beetroot's address was in the middle of nowhere. Google Earth showed an empty field of tall grass.  We went down the road in both directions, and found that the addresses on the few mailboxes didn't line up with Google Earth. So we clicked down the road to a small house in surrounded by fields for hundreds of yards. The address marker had the address of the original discovered address from whois. The small house had multiple satellite dishes (like one would have for Dish or Direct TV), which would make sense for middle of nowhere internet. And the smile on the Mona Lisa? We spun the Google Earth around, and someone had paid the money to put an internet junction box like you see in suburbs right across the street from this house in the middle of nowhere. There were still signs of a fresh trench dig and fill in from there to the direction of the highway. And a fresh strip of asphalt from it across the street to (what I assessed with High Confidence based on everything together) was Beetroot's house.

From a Threat Intel standpoint, this was unbelievable. It was the Deathly Hollows, the Lost Ark, even the alien from Area 51. We had tradecraft. We had a full timeline from start to current. We had targets. We had consistent TTPs stretching over years. And we had Beetroot's home.

We imagined that's what it felt like when the Mandiant researcher stood outside the office building in Shanghai and took that picture.

Beetroot represented something that gets zero discussion in most online Infosec circles - the Persistent Threat. We hear about Advanced Persistent Threats all the time. And we hear about script kiddies who wreak havoc with a tool. Beetroot fell in the middle. Beetroot probably started out as one person, and then worked with others to make his scam work. Beetroot's skills improved with time. But Beetroot never wiped his slate clean. As his tradecraft got better, he didn't clean up his previous footprints.

Persistent threats have greater initial technical debt, and much more limited resources. They need to build on previous successes with very limited budgets. Their advantage is it's harder to defend than attack, and Beetroot wasn't attacking anyone who had the means to fight back. But the work wasn't lucrative enough to throw away his old infrastructure, and then he likely forgot about it. He diversified, but not enough. He (like most adversaries) had consistent TTPs across his fraud. Lone indicators were a starting point, but the TTPs were so obvious from one to the next.

We think of the near impossibility of finding APTs without multiple dedicated staff assigned to each Infosec function. And how would one train to challenge such an adversary? Lots of businesses will fall into the targeting reticule of one of the many APTs. But for each of the APTs, there are dozens of persistent threats coming after your networks, with tradecraft not as good. You can use these to show successes to leadership. You can use these to sharpen your skills. And you can use the learning experience to better position yourself to catch the advanced threats, who will also make mistakes.

Give your adversary every opportunity to make a mistake. They will. And you will catch them.

Infosec_Samurai

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